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PUBLIC NUISANCE: STANDING TO SUE WITHOUT SHOWING
"SPECIAL INJURY"
Save Sand Key, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 281 So. 2d 572
(2d D.C.A.), appeal dismissed, 286 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1973)
Concerned with plans for the development of condominiums along Sand
Key beach, appellant brought suit, seeking declaratory relief to confirm certain alleged vested rights of its members and the public in the recreational
use of a soft sand portion of the beach. 2 Additional counts sought injunctive
relief from a public nuisance in the form of a purpresture blocking enjoyment
of these rights. Upon appellee's motion, the circuit court dismissed appellant
from the suit with prejudice, since it had not alleged any special injury differing in kind from that suffered by the public generally. 3 On appeal, the
Second District Court of Appeal reversed and HELD, a person who is entitled
to enjoyment of a right, or who directly and personally suffers or is about to
suffer an injury, may sue for relief or redress whether or not such right or
4
injury is special to him or is shared in common with the public generally.
The "special injury" rule arose in conjunction with the common law of
public, or common, nuisances.5 Since the commission of an act that constituted

1. The instant case actually originated with two plaintiffs. One, the State of Florida on
the relation of the attorney general, relied upon the statutory grant of standing in §60.05.
The other, Save Sand Key, Inc., based its right to maintain the action upon actual and
prospective injury to its organizational interests and the interests and rights of its members.
The circuit court then ruled that Save Sand Key, Inc. was not a "proper party" and had
no standing to sue. It was from this decision and order that appellant, Save Sand Key, Inc.,
appealed. See notes 24-26 infra.
2. See City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 271 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1972). Where the
general public used soft sand area for more than 20 years and where such use was open,
notorious, visible, and adverse under apparent claim of right and without a material challenge or interference by anyone purporting to be the owner, the public acquired a prescriptive right to continued use and enjoyment of the area. Appellant in the instant case
relied as well upon implied dedication, custom, and the state public trust doctrine to establish its alleged rights in the dry sand area of Sand Key. See generally Commentary, Easements: Judicial & Legislative Protection of the Public's Rights in Florida's Beaches, 25
U. FLA. L. REv. 586, 587-92 (1973).
3. 281 So. 2d 572, 573 (2d D.C.A.), appeal dismissed, 286 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1973).
4. Id. at 577. The court also held that "a bona fide non-profit organization may sue for
and on behalf of some or all of its members who have been or will be directly and personally
aggrieved in some manner relating to and within the scope of the interests represented and
advanced by such organization ....
[and] facts and circumstances are alleged which, if true,
are sufficient to support a finding that there exist enforceable prescriptive rights in the public
to the soft sand area of Sand Key." Id.
5. The earliest public nuisance cases involved obstruction of the public way. See, e.g.,
Pain v. Patrick, 87 Eng. Rep. 191 (K.B. 1691); William's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 163 (K.B. 1592).
See also Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REv. 997 (1966). This line
of cases was subsequently expanded to include "any act not warranted by law, or omission
to discharge a legal duty, which obstructs or causes inconvenience or damage to the public
in the exercise of rights common to all Her Majestey's subjects." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF ToRTS, Explanatory Note §821B at 4 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971), quoting J. STEP-EN, GEN-
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or resulted in a public nuisance was considered a violation of the Crown's
rights, it was indictableo and punishable by fine and imprisonment, or in some
cases by corporal punishment. 7 Initially, therefore, the action remained exclusively a criminal one and the remedy appropriately in the hands of the
Crown.8 To enable a private individual to maintain an action to recover for
an injury caused by a public nuisance, the courts developed the requirement
that the individual must have suffered some special injury different from that
suffered by the common public.9 The courts expressed the fear that to allow a
private action without any special injury would subject the offending party to
a multiplicity of suits.' 0 Thus, while the courts approved claims seeking redress
for special injuries caused by a public nuisance, they continued to regard indictment by public officials as the only proper remedy for the protection of
the common right.
With the adoption of the common law in the United States, the special
injury rule continued to be an element in public nuisance actions brought by
private individuals. It was adopted and applied in New York in 182811 and
was accepted by the United States Supreme Court in 1838 when it held:
"[T]he plaintiff cannot maintain a stand in a court of equity, unless he avers
and proves some special injury."'12 Like the scope of the public nuisance action,
the application of the special injury requirement expanded, eventually including actions by taxpayers challenging expenditures'13 and individuals challenging agency action. 14 The requirement was accepted throughout the United
States as an essential element in a variety of actions. 15
Florida first espoused its acceptance of the special injury rule in 1875 in
Lutterloh v. Mayor of Town of Cedar Key.16 The court stated: "[Tf special

injury be threatened, [the parties so threatened] may demand that their prop105 (2d ed. 1890).
6. See, e.g., Mayor of New York v. Board of Health, 81 How. Pr. 385 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
1866); Penruddock's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 210 (C.P. 1598). See also 7 M. BACON, ABRIDGMENT

ERAL ViEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND

OF THE LAw 234 (1846).
7. BACON, supra note 6, at 234.
8. Id.

9. Lansing v. Smith, 8 Cow. 146, 152 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1828); Pain v. Patrick, 87 Eng. Rep.
191 (K.B. 1691); William's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 163 (K.B. 1592).
10. See, e.g., Lansing v. Smith, 8 Cow. 146 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1828); William's Case, 77 Eng.
Rep. 163 (K.B. 1592).
11. Lansing v. Smith, 8 Cow. 146 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1828).
12. Mayor of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 91, 99 (1838).
13. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
14. E.g., Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939); The Chicago
Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258, 267 (1924).
15. E.g., Whaley v. Wilson, 112 Ala. 627, 20 So. 922 (1896) (obstruction in road); Truesdale v. Town of Greenwich, 116 Conn. 426, 165 A. 201 (1933) (development of public park);
Van Corlandt v. New York Cent. R.R., 265 N.Y. 249, 192 N.E. 401 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1934)
(obstruction of navigable river); Fugate v. Carter, 151 Va. 108, 144 S.E. 483 (1928) (garage
built in public street).
16. 15 Fla. 306 (1875). Although the court spoke in terms of a public nuisance, the
alleged nuisance was both public and private, since it interfered with the use and enjoyment of private property. The relief granted was based upon this private nuisance.
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erty be protected against injury by such ... nuisances." 17 The Florida courts
further interpreted the rule to require injury different in kind as opposed to
different merely in degree,18 maintaining that such a position was necessary
to secure an efficient administration of justice and to avoid the multiplicity of
actions feared by other courts.19 Special injury came to be required for private
actions challenging expenditure of public funds,20 agency activities,21 and zoning changes.22

The Florida Legislature recognized in 1917 that there were certain public
nuisance situations where a private individual should be allowed to bring an
action in the name of the state on the relation of the individual.2 3 This statutory grant of standing is still in force, but applies only in an action for an injunction or for abatement of a defined public nuisance.2 4 It has been held to
be in effect an action in which the public is the real complainant.25 So while
the courts were extending the requirement for special injury well beyond the
area of its original development and application, 26 the legislature was providing for private citizen action without special injury in certain cases.
The first evidence of a reevaluation of the special injury rule and its effect
on the standing question came from the United States Supreme Court in 1968
in Flast v. Cohen.2 7 In this taxpayer suit challenging federal spending, the
Court recognized standing without requiring a showing of special injury. The
Court indicated that standing was merely a threshhold question determining
whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated would be presented in an adversary context.2 8 With this emphasis on the adversary context, the standing
criterion approached "injury-in-fact," '29 "aesthetic, conservational, and recrea-

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 308.
Jacksonville, T. & K.W. Ry. v. Thompson, 34 Fla. 346, 16 So. 282 (1894).
Brown v. Florida Chautauqua Ass'n, 59 Fla. 447, 451, 52 So. 802, 804 (1910).
Rickman v. Whitehurst, 73 Fla. 152, 74 So. 205 (1917).
Doherty & Co. v. Joachim, 146 Fla. 50, 200 So. 238 (1941).

22. Boucher v. Novotny, 102 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1958).
23. Fla. Laws 1917, ch. 7376, §§2-4 (now FLA. STAT. §§60.05-.06 (1971)).
24. FA. STAT. §823.05 (1971) specifies that certain acts and conditions are nuisances and
subject to abatement or injunction pursuant to FLA. STAT. §§60.05-.06 (1971). The Florida
supreme court recently held that the legislature has broad discretion to designate a particular
activity as a public nuisance, and that such nuisance would also be subject to action pursuant
to §§60.05 and 60.06 even though not within §823.05. Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. State
ex rel. Powell, 262 So. 2d 881, 884-85 (Fla. 1972).

25. E.g., National Container Corp. v. State ex reL. Stockton, 138 Fla. 32, 189 So. 4 (1939);
Pompano Horse Club, Inc. v. State ex rel. Bryan, 93 Fla. 415, 111 So. 801 (1927).

26. See, e.g., Boucher v. Novotny, 102 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1958); Doherty & Co. v. Joachim,
146 Fla. 50, 200 So. 238 (1941); Rickman v. Whitehurst, 73 Fla. 152, 74 So. 205 (1917).
27. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). See also Note, Standing on the Side of the Environment: A
Statutory Prescriptionfor Citizen Participation,1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 561 (1971).
28. 392 U.S. at 101.
29. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
Since appellant in Data Processing relied upon a specific statute impliedly authorizing
standing, as well as upon the general grant in the Administrative Procedure Act, the Court
established a two-pronged test requiring appellant to show that it has suffered "injury in
fact" and is also within the zone of interests protected by the specific statute relied upon.
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tional as well as economic."30 The Court expressly dismissed the long espoused

spectre of multiplicity of actions, recognizing the ability of the courts to exercise judicial discretion in order to avert completely frivolous lawsuits.31
These recent federal actions defining and expanding injury-in-fact were
based on judicial interpretation of statutory authority giving "persons aggrieved" 32 standing to challenge agency action. 3 The Supreme Court expanded
this concept in Sierra Club v. Morton,34 holding that where a party does not
rely on statutory authorization the question of standing depends on whether
the party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome that the dispute
will be presented in an adversary context.35 This personal stake was later held
in a lower federal court to require only a showing of injury-in-fact, with or
without statutory authorization beyond section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act.30
In the instant decision, the court recognized the erosion of the special injury requirement and considered the requirement no longer a viable expedient
in the disposition of cases.37 Although Florida courts had previously required
this showing of special injury in certain actions concerning zoning changes,33
the Florida supreme court recently granted standing where the aggrieved
person had a legally recognizable interest that had or would have been affected, even though that interest might have been shared with other members
of the community.3 9 This holding did much to dilute the special injury rule
in suits challenging both agency action and zoning changes, two areas into
which the original rule had expanded. The principal case accepted and extended this trend to expressly include public nuisance actions 40
The instant court summarily dismissed the long relied upon contention
that the absence of a required showing of special injury would result in a

The concurring opinion urged the application of the "injury in fact" test alone, and this
approach seems to be accepted where no specific statute is relied upon to confer standing.
See text accompanying note 37 infra. See also Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37
U. Cm. L. REv. 450 (1970).
30. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
31. Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 617 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 941 (1966). In an exhaustive analysis of the standing question, the court in Scanwelt
makes reference to a similar dismissal in a much earlier case, Associated Indus., Inc. v. Ickes,
134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
32. 5 U.S.C. §702 (1970) allows a "person aggrieved" by federal agency action standing
to challenge such action in a judicial proceeding.
33. E.g., Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Association of Data Processing Serv.
Organizations v. Camp, 397 US. 150 (1970).
34. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 732.
Lee v. Resor, 348 F. Supp. 389, 392 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
281 So. 2d at 575.
See Boucher v. Novotny, 102 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1958).
Renard v. Dade County, 261 So. 2d 882, 837 (Fla. 1972).
281 So. 2d at 575.
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multiplicity of actions. 41 Following recent federal court rulings, 42 the court
recognized that the economic practicalities of the present legal system, 43 as
well as the precedential value of a prior decided case on a given point and
the principles that inhere with the doctrine of res judicata, 44 would restrict the
number of actions brought.
The validity of the instant court's dismissal of the multiplicity argument is well demonstrated by recent experience in Michigan. In 1970 the
state legislature promulgated an Envioronmental Protection Act, which allowed
a private person to maintain an action for declaratory or equitable relief for
the protection of the environment against other persons, corporations, or governmental agencies. 4 5 The effect of the Act was not to open the floodgates to
the courts as many feared, 46 but rather to enable the courts to shift the balance
of power while remaining in the background. This allowed many cases to be
settled out of court and others to approach a more rapid determination of
the issues and to reach a competent forum for their adjudication. 4 7 A survey
conducted among attorneys involved in litigation under the Act revealed that
the cost, including expert witnesses and compilation of pertinent technical
data, averaged approximately 10,000 dollars for a case that went through a
full trial.48 These figures, together with the demonstrated expertise of the
parties involved and the court's ability to understand and cope with the merits
intelligently, demonstrate the value of an available judicial forum for the
49
settlement of recognized disputes.
The instant decision, recognizing the alleged rights of the appellant as
developed in City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc.,50 considered the
trend away from special injury to be mandated by section 21, Declaration of
Rights of the Florida constitution, 51 which provides that the courts "shall be

41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Siena Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972); Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer,
424 F.2d 859, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d
608, 617 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966); Lee v. Resor, 348 F. Supp. 389,
392 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
43. 281 So. 2d at 575. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608,
617 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). See also Sax & Connor, Michigan's
Environmental Protection Act of 1970: A Progress Report, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1004 (1972).
44. The court specifically noted that res judicata principles would limit litigation because
of the increasing number of well-tried class actions. 281 So. 2d at 575.
45. MICH. Coars. LAws ANNOT. §§691.1201-07 (1973). This act established that "any
for the properson ... may maintain an action .. . for declaratory or equitable relief ...
tection of the environment from pollution, impairment, or destruction." Id. §691.1202.
46. Sax & Conner, supra note 43, at 1007. The first 21 months of the Act's existence revealed only 39 cases filed, with 13 of these settled and averaging only 6 months in length. Id.
at 1009.
47. Id. at 1009-10.
48. Id. at 1098-1100.
49. Id. at 1080-81. "More than anything else, the Act has instilled in ordinary citizens
a confidence that it is possible for them to have their day in court."
50. 271 So. 2d 765 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
51. 281 So. 2d at 575.
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open to every person for redress of any injury.' '52 This interpretation and application expressly overrules a recent decision by the same court 53 and conflicts with the First District Court of Appeal's decision in Sarasota County
Anglers Club, Inc. v. Burns.54 The SarasotaAnglers decision, although decided

prior to the adoption in 1968 of the more inclusive "court access" section of
the Florida constitution, relied on the fear of multiplicity of actions as one
basis for dismissing the suit. 55 Subsequent decisions, however, have opened
the courts to individuals previously unable to qualify for standing under the
special injury rule - seemingly eroding the basis for the Sarasota Anglers decision and reinforcing the ruling in the instant case.56
While early Florida cases fully anticipated action by public officials where

no special injury existed,5 7 the instant case exemplifies the factors that some-

times affect state action. Following the trial court's ruling dismissing appellant,
and the voluntary dismissal by the state on the public nuisance counts, 58 the
Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund was left as the only

"proper party." Appellee then entered into an agreement for the sale of a part
of Sand Key to a local city government. The agreement included a provision
that appellee could cancel the sale if the city or state instituted any litigation
pertaining to the claimed public rights in and to Sand Key. The Trustees,
therefore, deferred action on the suit against appellees, not wishing to jeopardize the city's position.59 This left the alleged rights without protection and
without a proper party willing to act to secure such protection.6 0

FLA. CoNsT. art. I, §21.
53. Askew v. Hold the Bulkhead-Save Our Bays, Inc., 269 So. 2d 696 (2d D.CA. Fla.
1972).
54. 193 So. 2d 691 (1st D.C.A. Fla.), cert. denied, 200 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1967). This was
relied upon by the circuit court in dismissing appellants in the original action in the instant case. 281 So. 2d 572, 573 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
55. 193 So. 2d at 693.
56. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972); Association of Data Processing
Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer,
424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608,
617 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966); Lee v. Resor, 348 F. Supp. 389, 392
(M.D. Fla. 1972). See also Cannery Local 444 v. Winter Haven Hosp., Inc., 279 So. 2d 23 (Fla.
1973); Department of Administration v. Home, 269 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1972). These cases
demonstrate an awareness of the changing emphasis on the standing question and the
courts' attempts to make a judicial forum available for the adjudication of justiciable disputes. This position has been propounded by Professor Davis. Davis, supra note 29.
57. See, e.g., Page v. Niagara Chem. Div. of Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 68 So. 2d 382,
384 (Fla. 1953); Rickman v. Whitehurst, 73 Fla. 152, 74 So. 205 (1917); Brown v. Florida
Chautauqua Ass'n, 59 Fla. 447, 52 So. 802 (1910). See also BACON, supra note 6, at 235.
58. 281 So. 2d at 573 n.1.
59. Comment, Standing of a Citizen Group To Sue in the Public Interest, 47 Fr.& B.J.
733 (1974). Letter from Tom. R. Moore to Jeffrey B. Marks, President, Environmental Law
Society, University of Florida, Oct. 8, 1973.
60. 281 So. 2d at 574; see Note, supra note 27, at 567-76 n.5. See also Little, New Attitudes About Legal Protection for Remains of Florida'sNatural Environment, 23 U. FLA.
52.

L. Rxv. 459, 497-98 (1971).
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The special injury rule developed as a judicially imposed doctrine to prevent an individual and the courts from being subjected to a multiplicity of
criminal and civil actions for an act resulting in injury to the common public.
It evolved into an obstacle preventing recovery for an injury actually sustained
or for protection from a future injury if such injury was or would be suffered
in common with the community. It also resulted in the lack of a forum for
the community to redress any common injuries. Even where an actual injury
was recognized 6' or the action was for abatement or injunction and the
multiplicity factor could not be relevant,62 the courts unhesitatingly followed
the established rules and refused to grant redress or relief. The present movement away from "special injury" toward "injury-in-fact" indicates that courts
are becoming more cognizant of the public's desire and right to utilize the
63
judicial process to seek redress for actual injury, whether common or special.
The public has demonstrated an ability to present the essential issues with
sufficient clarity to insure the requisite adversary context.64 The instant decision recognizes the judiciary's ability to utilize modern rules of procedure
and pleading to insure that the proper parties and issues are before it.65 By
refusing to apply inflexible and outdated standards that prevent, rather than
promote, an efficient administration of justice, the instant court has demonstrated Florida's expanding judicial desire to allow citizen participation in the
resolution of problems that directly affect them, whether individually or in
common with the community.
TiM E. SLE'r

61. Venuto v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 22 Cal. App. 3d 116, 99 Cal. Rptr. 350
(1971); Page v. Niagara Chem. Div. of Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 68 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1953);
Doherty & Co. v. Joachim, 146 Fla. 50, 200 So. 238 (1941).
62. E.g., Page v. Niagara Chem. Div. of Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 68 So. 2d 382 (Fla.
1953).
63. See 117 CONG. REc. 4392-94 (1971). Senator Hart speaking for S. 1032, a bill that
would provide a right of action for all citizens for relief for protection of the environment,
stated: "What is really at issue here is the broadening of participation by citizens in the
resolution of problems which directly affect them." Senator McGovern, speaking for the same
bill, stated: "The victims are the American people . . . I refer to the steady ravaging of our
environment by industrial growth and governmental neglect ....
The individual citizen has
been prevented from intervening and participating in the regulatory process by a variety of
legal and administrative roadblocks."
64. 281 So. 2d at 576. See also Sax & Conner, supra note 43, at 1037.
65. Additional flexibility is available to the courts in their ability to fashion the remedy
that is allowed. A Florida court declared in an 1887 public nuisance action: "Every judgment
should be adapted to the nature of the nuisance of which a defendant may be convicted."
Palatka & I.R. Ry. v. State, 23 Fla. 546, 559, 3 So. 158, 164 (1887). The court has also recognized that if an injunction would subject a defendant to grossly disproportionate hardship, equity may be denied. See, e.g., City of Lakeland v. State ex rel. Harris, 143 Fla. 761,
197 So. 470 (1940). The authors of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs 19 (Tent. Draft No. 17,
1971) have also recognized that where the relief requested is an injunction or abatement, the
special injury rule is far less applicable and there are indications of a possible change.
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